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Some say that it is nothing but an illusion to think of a world totally without nuclear weapons. 
This might be true. Nonetheless, although the total abolition of nuclear weapons seems, at 
present, to be quite difficult, promoting Nuclear Weapons Free Zones (NWFZs) from a regional 
standpoint might encourage further large-scale non-proliferation processes. NWFZs are impor-
tant elements to be brought into the debate when dealing with the non-proliferation of nuclear 
weapons on a global scale. Also for regional security reasons, NWFZs are crucial. In particular, 
there is a need for an NWFZ in Northeast Asia. 
 
The ultimate goal of a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ) is to establish the abolishment of 
nuclear weapons in a certain geographical sphere; moreover, an essential issue to be promoted 
is the elimination of the danger of being involved in a nuclear war [1]. States that are included 
in a NWFZ promote security in the area by making an agreement neither to manufacture 
nuclear weapons of their own nor to host any nuclear weapons of others [1,2]. Furthermore, 
prevention for the area from being attacked by nuclear weapons, as specified in respective 
treaties, is achieved by obtaining security guarantees from nuclear-weapon states (also called 
‘negative security’).  
Since NWFZs are based on international treaties, they can be perceived as truly trustworthy 
measures with regards to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, NWFZs play a 
crucial role in nuclear disarmament as well, since they enhance regional (and ultimately, univer-
sal) security, regional detente, regional reliance, and they promote the complete elimination of 
nuclear weapons. 
The proliferation of nuclear weapons is an issue which must not be left behind. It is a 
matter of common security and the common good. In this sense, the creation of new NWFZs is 
an effective way for achieving security on a regional basis, which in the end can be sewed up 
into a global ‘quilt’ of nuclear weaponless regions [3]. Whereas focusing on a global image 
from the beginning is difficult, focusing on the regional level allows us to ground our thoughts 
and actions. 
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The relation between the NPT and Nuclear Weapons Free Zones 
The core of the global non-proliferation regime is the wide-spanning Treaty on the Non-Pro-
liferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The NPT prohibits transfer to, acceptance of, as well as 
the manufacture of any nuclear weapons or other military explosive nuclear devices whatsoever 
by non-nuclear-weapon states. However, as is clear from Article 2 of the Treaty, the stationing 
of nuclear weapons is not prohibited; in other words, a loophole to the regime exists. In 
contrast, Nuclear Weapons Free Zone treaties, in addition to all the matters that the NPT pro-
hibits, do not allow for the stationing of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive devices 
within the territories of state parties. Needless to say, NWFZ treaties are more rigorous than the 
NPT in terms of proliferation. To sign and ratify NWFZ treaties (and certain additional proto-
cols) along with the NPT therefore promotes a healthy path towards nuclear disarmament and 
non-proliferation [1]. The establishment of an NWFZ should be seen not just as a measure for 
non-proliferation, but also as one for nuclear disarmament. 
This fact is well recognised by the non-proliferation regime: Article VII of the NPT states 
that nothing in the Treaty ‘affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties 
in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories’; likewise, 
‘in the principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament’ adopted by the 
NPT Review and Extension Conference held in 1995, establishing NWFZs was recognised as a 
sophisticated approach which is strongly welcomed and valued by the international community 
[4]. There exists an exceedingly essential and mutually complementary relation between the 
different treaties belonging to the nuclear weapons regime, NWFZ treaties included. 
The concept of a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone 
The ultimate goals of NWFZs are accomplished through a binding legal instrument between 
two or more States which agree on the absence of nuclear weapons in a specific region, along 
with a series of verification and compliance mechanisms, as well as negative security guarantees 
by all nuclear-weapon states [5]. Nuclear weapons free regions, in a more general sense, need 
not be defined by groups of countries: Mongolia declared itself a Nuclear Weapons Free State 
and had its status confirmed by the UN General Assembly; in addition, following the end of the 
Cold War and the unification of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democra-
tic Republic (DDR), the former DDR territory, now part of the NATO territory, was declared a 
nuclear weapons free area. 
In defining an NWFZ, it is necessary to consider whether the area in question is populated 
[6]. To this extent, we can say that there exist five NWFZs in the world today; the Latin and 
Caribbean NWFZ, the South Pacific NWFZ, the Southeast Asia NWFZ, the African NWFZ, and 
the Central Asian NWFZ. Each zone is legitimised by specific treaties, namely, the Treaty for 
Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco), 
the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Rarotonga Treaty), the Treaty on the Southeast 
Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (Bangkok Treaty), the Treaty on the Nuclear Weapons Free 
Zone in Africa (Pelindaba Treaty), and the Central Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty 
(Semipalatinsk Treaty) [7].  
The main and most obvious objective of an NWFZ is the ‘total abolition of nuclear weap-
ons’ [8]. As mentioned above, NWFZ treaties comprehend both aspects that are considered by 
the NPT (the production, transfer, and so forth of nuclear explosive devices) and aspects that 
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are neglected by the NPT (the stationing of nuclear weapons). However, NWFZs are also meant 
to guarantee that State Parties will not be targeted by existing nuclear-weapon states. This, in 
brief, is granted by negative security assurances which are granted by the nuclear-weapon 
states. Such assurances raise the security level of non-nuclear states which take the path down 
permanent disarmament to an even higher and definite stage. 
Brief historical background  
The idea of NWFZs arose in 1956, prior to the constitution of the NPT. In March 1956, a pro-
posal was presented to a United Nations Committee on Disarmament which sought to obtain 
partial arms restrictions, the establishment of regions under constant inspection, as well as a 
prohibition of the stationing of nuclear equipped forces, nuclear weapons and hydrogen weap-
ons, on German soil and in neighbouring states [9]. This proposal, which had been presented 
by the Soviet Union, was adopted and rephrased in a more sophisticated form by the Foreign 
Minister of Poland, Adam Rapacki, and presented during a session of the United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly in October 1957 [10]. Nevertheless, this idea to establish a denuclearised zone in 
Central Europe was suppressed due to the Cold War; more in general, although several propo-
sals were made towards the denuclearisation of Europe – for example, of the Balkan Peninsula 
(1957) and of Northern Europe (1959) [11] – none have come to fruition.  
Analysing NWFZs 
Although it is clear that the establishment of NWFZs is a vital step in the direction of non-
proliferation and disarmament, doing so involves many steps and is thus a complicated pro-
cess. However, history proves that, albeit complicated, it is not impossible: today there are 
three established Nuclear Weapons Free Zones supported by treaties that have entered into 
force (The Pelindaba Treaty and the Semipalatinsk Treaty have not yet entered into force.) To-
day, 74% of all of the territories not encompassed by nuclear weapon powers (these territories 
include Antarctica) are situated within NWFZs, including 99% of all the land in the southern 
hemisphere. Out of 195 States, 114 belong to such denuclearised zones, comprising about 1.8 
billion people who do not live under the direct shadow of nuclear war. This means that, 
indeed, there are successful models for establishing further similar zones. The existing zones 
can be analysed and compared in order find defining features, common strengths, and particu-
lar weaknesses. 
A quick overview of the three active NWFZs reveals two fundamental criteria for the crea-
tion of a successful denuclearised zone: a strong bondage between regional states and stable 
relations with the nuclear-weapon states. The first highlights the necessity of strong regional 
organisations such as the Organisation for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin Ame-
rica and the Caribbean (OPANAL) in Latin America, the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) in the 
South Pacific, Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) in Southeast Asia, and African 
Union (AU) in Africa. From this point of view, the NWFZ being established in Central Asia 
(between Turkmenistan, Kyrgizia, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kazakhstan) does not have a 
strong and reliable regional organisation. And although establishing an NWFZ does not require 
as a sine qua non such an organisation, its presence will be central to the success of the project 
in the long run.  
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Furthermore, many states that live under the umbrella of an NWFZ possess a common his-
tory. Common historical understandings among regional states work to strengthen the bon-
dage within the region. One of the qualifications for the establishment of an NWFZ derives 
from the historical question of whether states were ‘directly’ involved in the Cold War or not 
[12]. The bondage/history relation becomes controversial when dealing with countries that 
were not at the periphery of the Cold War. For regions, however, that were not strongly 
involved in the Cold War and that are also linked by strong regional organisations, it is easier 
to establish an NWFZ. Still, for such regions, the end of the Cold War provided a trigger. For 
example, the establishment of an NWFZ in Southeast Asia was largely conditioned to the with-
drawal of the United States’ army from the Philippines. Nuclear weapons were a symbol of the 
Cold War; thus, it can be assumed that some – though not strong – involvement in the Cold 
War and the legacy which derived from it did not hinder but rather endorsed the establishment 
of an NWFZ. 
The aftermath of the Cold War also reveals the importance of having stable relations with 
the nuclear powers. In order for an NWFZ to be effective, it requires recognition from nuclear-
weapon states so as to ensure the absolute denuclearisation of the region, even in the event of 
war. Therefore, co-operation from these states is necessary.  
In his thesis, Tosaki describes four obstacles in establishing NWFZs: the existence of thres-
hold states; the possibility of being attacked by neighbouring nuclear-weapon states; the temp-
tation of possessing nuclear weapons as a deterrent to deal with the proliferation of biological 
and chemical weapons; and as a means to forge an alliance with nuclear-weapon states [8]. In 
considering these obstacles, the first and the last can be solved, as proven by the Latin Ameri-
can, South African, and Asian cases.  
The problem is that although many emphasise the importance of establishing more 
NWFZs, there is little succes in achieving this goal. Not enough qualifications do yet exist that 
stimulate the establishment of NWFZs. These qualifications are the existence of an initiative 
state, time for negotiation, assured transcendence of states, detainment of the neutrality for 
denuclearisation, environmental preparation, and general détente [13].  
Peaceful and military uses: what differentiates the two? 
Another key issue, and probably one of the most difficult issues in establishing NWFZs, is that 
the borderline between peaceful and military uses of nuclear devices is quite ambiguous. 
There are two possibilities for contemplating this issue. The first is that there is an urgent 
need in drawing a legal line between peaceful and military uses of nuclear technologies. This is 
based on the anxiety of the dual use of these technologies. As we face a serious energy short-
age in the years to come, the need to secure energy will emerge as an essential issue: therefore 
to use and develop energy-supplying systems via nuclear power is inevitable and indispensable. 
However, proliferation is the dark side of nuclear energy [14], and reaching a consensus in this 
context is a difficult task which involves many actors and their expectations. 
The second possibility is to distinguish between types of nuclear explosions, namely, 
whether they are for peaceful uses or not. The reason why the nuclear non-proliferation regime 
still retains its value is because there is a formal treaty on which the regime is based. However, 
the criterion to define whether an explosion is a peaceful one or not has yet to be decided 
upon. NWFZ treaties prohibit nuclear weapons but do not prohibit the peaceful use of nuclear 
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energy, explosives included. But to what extent is the legal framework sensitive to the bounda-
ries between peaceful and not peaceful? The question remains unsolved. One can only men-
tion that the recognition of this borderline problem has resulted in the provisions in the Raro-
tonga, Bangkok, and Pelindaba treaties that prohibit all nuclear explosive devices regardless of 
their intended use. While peaceful nuclear explosions for landscaping or other purposes were 
seriously considered in the 1960s, those ideas seem to have been abandoned.  
A Nuclear Weapons Free zone in Northeast Asia? 
Among the various proposals to establish NWFZs that followed the end of the Cold War, there 
is one in particular which deals with Northeast Asia. 
The proposal of the Northeast Asia NWFZ arose out of a series of meetings that began in 
1991 between retired diplomats and officers from South Korea, Russia, Japan, China, and the 
United States. Today, the proposal for an NWFZ in Northeast Asia is being promoted in a 
limited way and through a Track-II level process (i.e. through non-official channels). Official 
conferences and discussions are not yet held, which means that there are many high hurdles to 
overcome.  
The main actors that are promoting the establishment of this zone are Peace Depot [15], 
the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW) [16], and the Tokyo 
Physicians for Elimination of Nuclear Weapons (TPENW) [17]. These organisations have held a 
number of sessions at a non-governmental level and advocated the importance and necessity 
of establishing an NWFZ in Northeast Asia, as well as the process that must be taken to achieve 
this task.  
When defining Northeast Asia, there are several different opinions. In general, this 
scheme is thought to contain Japan, South Korea, North Korea, and parts of China and Rus-
sia, though some also include Mongolia. The important element in this proposal is that this 
region of the world contains two of the nuclear-weapon states as accepted in the current non-
proliferation regime (i.e. China and Russia). This is an unprecedented challenge since none of 
the four existing NWFZs contain mainland areas that are part of the territory of nuclear-weapon 
states; in other words, there is no model for what could become a treaty that establishes an 
NWFZ in Northeast Asia. The Latin American, South Pacific and African zones include, how-
ever, small dependencies of nuclear-weapon states. Therefore, the criteria and measures of par-
ticipation of states within the presupposed area are the keys in promoting this idea of establish-
ing an NWFZ in the region.  
The establishment of an NWFZ in Northeast Asia would be a crucial act in coping with the 
security issues of the Korean Peninsula and Japan. Hence, initiatives by South Korea and Japan 
are indispensable. Both countries are under the umbrella of nuclear security of the United 
States and in order to take initiatives, both states must grow out of this military and mental 
dependence. However, this step must be taken simultaneously. This is because both South 
Korea and Japan are restraining each other in the field of security policy, and since nuclear 
policy is firmly attached to this issue, security will not be achieved if the two states take steps 
individually. Walking the same path will take the two states to obtain the same goal, which will 
lead the region to achieve increased security. Also, movements for establishing an NWFZ will 
bring about a trust-building processes as well as a sense of common security for the region: 
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this is not just a by-product of denuclearising the region, but has an even more crucial meaning 
[18]. 
In assessing the establishment of an NWFZ in Northeast Asia, there are several issues to 
keep in mind. First, there is the matter of American bases located in the region; specifically in 
South Korea and Japan. These locations have long been in dispute in the context of the pres-
ence of nuclear missiles and materials in the region. The United States regards itself as the 
authority broker in Northeast Asia and, needless to say, the security within this specific region 
cannot be considered without the coordination of the United States. Therefore, it would be 
truly risky to exclude the presence of the United States from the region. 
There is also the problem of the remainder of the total eradication of historical hostilities. 
In order to create a certain NWFZ, there is a strong need of a well-built organisation as a inte-
grity-enhancing factor for the region. This integrity could be based on the common and cultur-
al background of the region. Therefore, measures toward the mediation of hostilities and a 
certain form of integrated identity are crucial in the establishment process of an NWFZ in 
Northeast Asia. Political and economic diversity and constant transfigurations are facts that 
must also be intensely studied. There may be ways is which the Six Party Talks might serve as a 
ground for negotiations towards a more concrete proposal for an NWFZ in the region. How-
ever, the talks have not yet seen significant achievements considering nuclear disarmament at 
the moment.  
Conclusion 
Nuclear Weapons Free Zones have a tremendously important role to play in non-proliferation 
and disarmament issues. Since nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament are enormously 
complex tasks, it is impossible to achieve the ultimate goal of complete disarmament by ap-
proaching this issue globally from the very beginning. Thus, I propose to start from regional 
approaches and ultimately sew them up into a one big global quilt. In this sense, using the logic 
of NWFZs to reinforce the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime can be under-
stood as an effective measure towards universal disarmament. NWFZs themselves will not and 
cannot stop proliferation of nuclear weapons; they are just one of the many options in the 
non-proliferation regime that must be used adequately. Reciprocal actions and strong mutual 
relations with global approaches such as the NPT are needed. This essential connection will 
further reinforce the capability that the NWFZs retain. 
As the proverb goes, ‘many a little makes a mickle’. I believe this idea also applies to nu-
clear non-proliferation and disarmament. It is still too early to give up. As a highly sophisticat-
ed scholar once noted, ‘the desire to concur a nuclear war is nothing but a proof of arrogance 
of people that have forgotten respect to this beautiful earth’ [19]. Consideration of the prolif-
eration of nuclear weapons is an invariable issue which all of us must not leave behind. It is a 
matter of common security, as was said by the Palme Committee (1982). We must contemplate 
nuclear weapons issues not just as a state-based interest issue, but rather as an overall issue 
posed to all of humanity. 
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